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The theoretical 10 literature has modeled the relationship between spillovers and cooperative (R&D)-
agreements extensively; suggesting that spillovers induce cooperation as  a means to  internalize these 
involuntary  effects,  while  cooperation  simultaneously  enhances  voluntary  spillovers  thtough 
information sharing.  The empirical literatute on this topic however is scarce.  This paper empirically 
assesses  the  interactions  between  alliances  and  transfers  of knowledge.  A  first  finding  is  that, 
consistent  with  the  theoretical  literatute,  the  occurrence  of alliances  is  correlated  with  traditional 
meaSutes  of (involuntary)  spillovers, based on  input-output relations and  technology proximity.  But 
not only R&D-cooperation corresponds to (the  lack of)  appropriability; the evidence shows  that also 
non-R&D alliances are associated with transfers of knowledge.  In a second part the impact of external 
know-how on the performance of industries in OEeD-countries is analyzed.  Following the association 
of alliances with spillovers, the impact of external know-how is weighted by the occurrence of alliances 
with the external source, based in the same industry or in other industries. Using information about 588 
inter- and intra-industry R&D  and  non-R&D  alliances  formed  in  the  period  '86-'96,  we  find  that 
industry R&D  levels  accessed through intra-industry R&D  alliances have  a negative impact on  (the 
growth of)  own productivity,  while this effect is  positive for  industries with intra-industry non-R&D 
alliances.  Know-how from other sectors has  no  significant impact on  productivity,  unless for  those 
sectors with which R&D alliances are prevailing that extend beyond R&D to include production and/or 
distribution.  In contrast to the findings in other studies, this effect of inter-industry spillovers is found 
to be negative. 
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The pervasiveness  of networking  has  become  a  significant  feature  in  current  innovation 
practices. In view of the  increasing complexity and multidisciplinary character of research, 
even the largest and most  self-contained of organizations requires information from beyond 
its boundaries.  Innovation increasingly derives from a network of companies interacting in a 
variety  of ways,  ranging from formal  structures  such  as  R&D consortia,  joint ventures,  to 
informal, implicit coordination, mutual exchange, "informal" know-how trading (von Hippel 
(1987).  But  companies  can  use  also  freely  available  information  or  involuntary  spillovers 
from innovators in their innovation process. 
In their strive for access to external know-how, the exploitation of complementarities 
between partners  and  sharing  of risks  and  costs,  frrms  increasingly  revert  to  cooperative 
modes.  The phenomenon  of R&D  cooperation has  received  considerable  attention  in  the 
theoretical  literature.  Many  l.0.  models  stress  as  important  feature  in  cooperation,  the 
utilization  and  protection  of  know-how.  Cooperation  is  seen  as  a  means  to  internalize 
involuntary spillovers.  At the same time,  cooperation allows  firms  to  voluntarily  optimize 
know-how transfers  by sharing information.  Alliances  are therefore not only important to 
promote the creation of know-how, but at the same time can be an effective instrument in the 
diffusion  of know-how.  From  an  innovation  policy  point  of view,  the  impact  of R&D 
cooperation on the innovative capacity of a nation,  should be assessed not only through its 
effect on increasing the stock of know-how, but also on its diffusion potential. 
Despite the  importance  of alliances  and  diffusion,  little empirical  evidence  exists, 
linking the two phenomenon, and its implications on firm,  sector or country performance.  So 
far,  the empirical literature has  focused  on  trying to  measure spiIIovers  and  assessing their 
impact  on  innovative  and  growth  performance.  Typically  information  from  input-output 
tables or patent information on technology users and suppliers is used to identify which agents 
generate spillovers  and  who  receives  spillovers.  The conclusion  of these  studies  (for  an 
overview, see e.g. Geroski (1996), Griliches (1992»  seems to be that spillovers are important 
and have a substantial impact on productivity growth. 
By using patent information or input-output tables, the existing empirical studies have 
only considered the impact of involuntarily flows  of knowledge on performance.  However 
there remains a large not yet analyzed area of voluntary spiIIovers, present in several forms of 
cooperation and joint ventures.  Geroski (1996) concludes that: 
"The rich information flows which connect innovation producers and users seems to 
me to  be much more  important than  other involuntary flows  between  more widely 
dispersed agents.  Whether  upstream/downstream flows  are  truly  spillovers  is  not 
clear,  but there is a lot of evidence to  suggest that many firms  try to nurture them. 
2 Case studies often suggest that cooperative  relations between innovation users and 
producers are a prime determinant of  the success of  innovative activities". 
Also Griliches (1998) points to the importance of interaction between producers and users of 
knowledge instead of the rather freewheeling involuntary character of :spillovers: 
"Knowledge is  not like a stock of ore,  sitting  there  waiting to  be mined.  It  is an 
extremely heterogeneous assortment of information in continuous flUX.  Only a small 
part of  it is of  any use to someone at a particular point of  time and it takes effort and 
resources  to  access,  retrieve  and adapt  it  to  one's  own  use.  Thus  models  of 
externalities must perforce be models of interaction between different actors in  the 
economy. 
With cooperation a vehicle for voluntary know-how transfers and an instrument to respond to 
involuntary spillovers, alliances can be considered as a spillover channel to access externally 
available know-how, as alternative to the traditional spillover measures. This study provides 
an empirical analysis using alliances to assess the impact of external know-how on industry 
growth performance.  After  a  review  of the  theoretical  and empirical  literature  on  R&D 
cooperation and alliances, section 4 presents a measure of inter and intra-industry spillovers, 
on the basis of the pattern of intra- and inter-industry alliances.  Also included is a correlation 
analysis  between  the alliance  matrix  and  the  more  traditional  spillover-matrices  and  the 
results  on  productivity  growth.  The  alliance  data  allow  to  explicitly  take  on  board  any 
difference  between  intra-industry  and  inter-industry  cooperation,  R&D  and  non-R&D 
alliances and the national versus international dimension. 
2.  Theoretical perspectives on spillovers and R&D-cooperation 
A central element in theoretical 10 models on horizontal R&D co-operation is how firms can 
utilize and protect their intellectual property. Voluntary or involuntary transfers of knowledge 
among firms  generate important spillovers.  The presence of such spillovers implies  that a 
distinction must be made between a firm's innovative effort and its effective knowledge base, 
representing the total  amount  of knowledge  available  to  the firm.  This  knowledge  base 
results from its own R&D as  well as from the R&D from other firms,  to the extent that this 
R&D  has  spilt  over.  When  anticipated  by  market  participants  such  spillovers  tend  to 
complicate R&D cooperation strategies in a non-trivial way. 
The Industrial Organization literature has  modeled spillovers and R&D-cooperation 
extensively (e.g.  Katz (1986), d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), for an overview see De 
Bondt (1991)).  The setting consists typically of competitors in the output market who  have 
3 the choice between independent R&D and coordinating their R&D-investmentsl .  The results 
suggest that R&D co-operation is most beneficial for technological progress when technology 
is difficult to keep proprietary.  Indeed, although spillovers will increase the stock of effective 
knowledge and  hence  have  a  market  expansion  or  cost  reduction  effect,  large  spillovers 
typically  have  a disincentive effect on  the firm's  levels  of non-eo-operative R&D.  This 
disincentive effect  has  its  full  impact in  a strategic two-stage model,  where firms  take into 
account that  whenever  knowledge  leaks  out  to  competing firms,  this  will  have a  negative 
impact  on  their  own  profitability,  thus  reducing  the  attractiveness  of  investing  in  R&D. 
Through co-operation in R&D,  focusing on mutual interests, this externality problem can be 
overcome.  In an industry-wide research joint venture, firms  will internalize these spillovers, 
which will have a positive effect on R&D levels when leakage is high. 
Not  only  will  cooperating firms  have a  higher  incentive  to  invest  in  R&D  when 
spillovers are large,  also  the profits  from cooperation increase with  spillovers.  The higher 
involuntary spillovers are, the more attractive and profitable R&D-cooperation is for firms in 
an industry. 
The disincentive effect from spillovers is  shaped by the product market competition. 
Firms producing differentiated products face a smaller competitive effect; which will lead to a 
lower critical spillover level,  and  a larger incentive to cooperate (De Bondt and Veugelers 
(1991».  Similarly,  the negative impact of inter-industry  spillovers  on  independent R&D-
investments is smaller than the impact of intra-industry spillovers (Steurs,  (1995».  Firms in 
one  industry  benefit  from  R&D  of firms  in  another  industry  without  suffering  from  the 
positive  spillover  externality  on  these  firms  (in  case  of  independent  industries).  The 
internalization of the spillover-externality by inter-industry cooperation leads to higher R&D 
investments (relative to intra-industry cooperation) and higher profits. 
Despite the ex ante profitability of collaboration, the stability of R&D agreements is 
often  threatened  by  incentives  for  firms  to  cheat  on  their  partners  (e.g.  Baumol  (1993), 
Shapiro & Willig (1990».  What  is  learned from the expertise of the  loyal partner can  be 
used  in  own  R&D  projects.  This  matters  especially  when  the  partuer  is  a  (potential) 
competitor; given  the importance of R&D  in  gaining a (long-term)  competitive advantage. 
Hence, designing co-operative agreements should consider not only when they are profitable, 
but also stable, in the sense that no cheating would occur.  Spillovers will not only affect the 
profits  from  collaboration,  but  also  the  incentives  to  cheat.  Despite  the  supra  noted 
conventional wisdom that spillovers increase co-operative profits, stable co-operation is easier 
to sustain when spillovers are low and this because of the lower incentives to cheat, at  least 
when spillovers are exogenous and not influenced by the partners (see Kesteloot & Veugelers 
(1994». 
I  Coordination of R&D-decisions does not allow joint R&D; synergies are not realized because of asset 
complementarity, a motive for R&D-cooperation often tackled in the empirical (management) 
4 When spillovers are considered to be at least partly voluntary, fIrms  that are partners 
in R&D co-operation can improve on the knowledge transfer among themselves, e.g. Kamien 
et  aI's Research Joint Venture typology  where spillovers  are  perfect.  2  Larger incoming 
spillovers for  partners  through  managing and  sharing information;  make R&D  cooperation 
even  more profitable.  Hence,  fIrms  will  typically  have  an  incentive  to  maximally  share 
information among partners.  At  the same time, information sharing stifles the incentives to 
cheat and hence makes cooperation more stable (Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994),  Eaton  & 
Eswaran  (1997».  Apart  from  selectively  sharing  information  between  partners,  the 
profitability and stability of R&D-cooperation is  further enhanced by protecting information 
(i.e. limiting outgoing spillovers) against free riding of non-partners. 
In  the mainstream La. models fIrms  are perfectly symmetric, they receive as  much 
spillovers  as  they  generate themselves.  Hence a joint occurrence of positive and  negative 
effects from spillovers results. When allowing firms  to  manage technology flows,  spillovers 
will typically be no longer symmetric. With endogenous spillovers, settings  will arise where 
partners will receive more than they generate or vice versa, leading to asymmetries in benefits 
and losses from cooperation.  The aim of managing intellectual property is  to  minimize the 
creation  of spillovers,  excluding  others  from  sharing.  At  the  same  time  fIrms  want  to 
maximize incoming  spillovers.  As  already  indicated,  they can do  so  by  cooperating with 
other fIrms  in information sharing cartels. Alternatively or at the  same time, they can try to 
increase incoming  spillovers  by  investing  in  "absorptive  capacity",  an  idea  pioneered  by 
Cohen & Levintahl (1989) and recently integrated in the La. models on R&D cooperation by 
Kamien & Zang (1998). 
Asymmetries in terms of technological capabilities to generate and absorb know-how 
may seriously influence firm's benefits and costs from cooperation.  Such asymmetries  are 
but one  example of differences  among partners  in  collaboration and  consequent costs  and 
benefIts  to cooperation.  More recent  models  take into  account  that  asymmetries  typically 
exist between firms; in terms of size or R&D efficiency, asymmetries that will influence the 
size of (incoming) spillovers and their impact on the incentives to cooperate.  A particularly 
interesting  scenario  to  examine  is  the  group  of  alliances  between  leaders  and  followers. 
Arguments can be put forward why leaders may learn more from followers,  an effect that is 
reminiscent of Cohen & Levintahl  's (1989)  work on absorptive capacity.  Leaders  may  be 
more able to effectively learn from others, to the extent that they have built up a larger know-
how base, which serves to  efficiently absorb.  But there are also  arguments  to  suggest that 
followers may learn more from leaders.  The leader has a larger know-how base that can be 
tapped by the followers, who may still be far from diminishing returns to knowledge creation. 
literature. 
2 Endogenous spillover model are increasingly being used, see a.o. Bhattacharya, Glaser & Sappington 
(1987). 
5 Sinha  and Cusumano  (1991) demonstrate  that big  firms  have a larger incentive to 
cooperate since they are better positioned to capture the benefits of cooperation.  Veugelers 
and  Kesteloot  (1995)  fmd  that R&D-cooperation  is  typically beneficial for  the  advantaged 
firm (in terms of productive efficiency, R&D efficiency and/or absorptive capacity), but such 
firms will only have an incentive to collaborate if  they receive a larger share in the benefits of 
the  alliance.  The latter effect arises because the larger firm  also  has  a larger incentive to 
cheat.  Cooperation is only attractive for the disadvantaged firm if the asymmetries are not too 
large.  Similarly, Roller et al (1997) fmd that while the high cost firm always has an incentive 
to  participate in R&D  co-operation,  the low  cost  firm  does  not  have  an  incentive to  join 
whenever products are highly substitutable and the asymmetry is large. 
Summarizing  the  insights  from  the  mainstream  theoretical  literature,  R&D 
collaboration  seems  to  be  positively  associated  with  transfers  of know-how,  involuntary 
through  the internalization  incentive and  voluntary  through  the  incentives  for  information 
sharing in  collaborative agreements.  More recent extensions  of the literature dealing with 
cheating  incentives,  endogenous  spillovers  and  asymmetries  in  absorption  and  R&D 
efficiency among partners have indicated that the gains from cooperation from the know-how 
transfers associated with alliances are not unanimously positive and symmetric.  Some firms 
may win more than others, some may loose; some cooperative agreements are more likely to 
be beneficial, others detrimental. 
3.  The empirical literature on spillovers and R&D-cooperation 
In contrast  to  the  theoretical  literature that  analyzed  the  central  role  of  spillovers  in  the 
analysis of R&D investments and the comparison between non-co-operative and co-operative 
R&D behavior extensively, the empirical literature studied the linkage between spillovers and 
R&D investment and performance only recently (see Geroski (1996) for a review». 
To  start  with,  spillovers  are  difficult  to  characterize  empirically.  The  channels 
through which spillovers occur are manifold and determine the extent of spillovers. Levin et 
al  (1987),  fmd  that  based  on  survey  data typical  spillover channels  are the  movement  of 
personnel, informal communication networks, meetings, input suppliers and customers, patent 
applications and reverse engineering (see also Mansfield (1985». These studies also suggest 
that  independent R&D  is  a very efficient channel for  absorbing external knowledge.  Also 
Harabi  (1995)  finds  that  independent R&D  is  the  most  effective channel  of intra-industry 
spillovers for  Swiss  companies.  These results  seem to  agree  with the model  of Cohen  & 
Levintahl (1989), where firms need to conduct R&D to be able to assimilate spillovers. 
Survey  results  for  Flanders  from  Eurostat/CIS  confirm  that  the  most  effective 
mechanisms  to  tap  external  sources  are  (in  order  of  importance)  purchase  of 
equipment/reverse  engineering,  movement  of  personnel,  communication  with  other 
6 companies, licenses and R&D outsourcing.  For fInns co-operating in R&D the same ranking 
prevails, but all of the modes are used more often than non-cooperating firms, (see Veugelers 
(1998),  supporting  a  positive  correlation  between  cooperation  in  R&D  and  involuntary 
spillovers.  When the firms  were asked to evaluate different mechanisms to protect the gains 
from innovation, legal instruments (patents and registration) are rated less important than finn 
strategies to protect the benefIts from innovation (secrecy, complexity and lead time).  Again 
companies  active  in  R&D  co-operation  consider  all  of  the  various  mechanisms  to  keep 
technological developments proprietary more crucial as compared to non co-operating fIrms. 
A crude analysis linking spillovers with R&D cooperation is provided in Veugelers & 
De  Bondt (1992),  who  use the  results  from  Bernstein  (1989),  Levin  &  Reiss  (1988)  and 
Bernstein & Nadiri (1989) to classify the industries according to the importance of spillovers 3 
and  test  whether  R&D  co-operation  occurs  more  in  high  spillover  industries.  They  find 
evidence for a  significantly higher number of joint ventures occurring in high and medium 
spillover industries.  Also the frequency of more infonnal co-operative agreements is higher 
in these industries.  All this strongly suggest that for fIrms both the creation and absorption of 
knowledge transfers are important for fIrms cooperating in R&D. 
Having empirically identified the importance of spillovers, assessing the impact of spillovers 
on R&D and performance is the next step. 
Empirical research specifIcally focusing on the relation between spillovers and R&D-
cooperation is  rather limited.  Brandstetter and Sakakibara (1998) as well  as  Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996) fInd some evidence that R&D-cooperation has a positive impact on research 
productivity,  which  they  attribute  to  increased  spillovers.  In a  paper  by  Cassiman  and 
Veugelers  (1998)  the  relationship  between  spillovers  and  R&D-cooperation  is  analyzed 
explicitly; firms which rate incoming spillovers as more important and which are able to limit 
outgoing spillovers are more likely to  cooperate.  At the  same time cooperating fIrms  have 
higher  incoming spillovers  and  higher  protection  of know  how;  an  indication  that  R&D-
cooperation is used by finns to manage infonnation flows. 
Most  of  the  empirical  literature  on  spillovers  analyzes  the  impact  of  external 
knowledge via spillovers on  the performance of agents  (firms,  industries and  countries ...  ).4 
The framework typically used in these studies is: 
Performance = f(own R&D, external R&D) 
3 High spillover industries are (tele)communcations, semi-conductors, instruments, chemicals and 
electronics.  Medium spillovers industries are mainly the transport equipment industries.  Low 
spillover industries include food & drink. 
4 This literature benefits from the new growth theory, which focus on knowledge and its externalities 
(e.g. spillovers) as source of sustained growth. 
7 Because knowledge transfers are not perfect, a measure of distance is used in order to identify 
the agents from whom most knowledge spills over.  The 'closer' generator and receiver are, 
the higher the level of spillovers is.  Several weighting schemes for  composing the external 
knowledge  of the  receiving  agent  are  used,  based  on  economic,  technological  or  trade 
relations. 
A  first  methodology  assumes  that  spillovers  follow  the  pattern  of  economic 
transactions (i.e. supplier -customer relations): customers receive spillovers because suppliers 
cannot perfectly discriminate between customers.  This approach based on input-output tables 
(Terleckyj (1974), Sveikauskas (1981», measures merely the so-called rent-spillovers and not 
necessarily knowledge spillovers5 (Griliches (1979». 
A second methodology is  targeted to  measure the pure knowledge spillovers and is 
principally based on patent information, although a few papers use innovations as information 
source (Sterlachini (1989), Acs, Audretsch &  Feldman (1992».  Patent information is used to 
identify producers and users of knowledge (Scherer (1982»; The so-called Yale studies use 
information on producing sectors and principal uses, information which  is  directly available 
in  some patent  administrations  (e.g.  Canada).  Another  approach  developed by  Verspagen 
(1994) uses the distinction between main versus supplementary sectors available in the EPO-
office, in  order to  identify users  and producers  of knowledge.  Patent-citations  are another 
source of information to trace spillovers, used e.g. by Jaffe, Henderson &  Traijtenberg (1993) 
to look for  geographical clusters.  A somewhat different approach is  used by Jaffe (1986), 
who  constructs  a  technological  distance  between  agents  on  the  basis  of the  technological 
overlap between patents of different firms. 
In  order to account for  international spillovers, Coe and Helpman (1995) use trade 
relations  between  countries  in  computing  stocks  of external  knowledge.  Foreign  direct 
investment is  another channel for  transferring international spillovers  (Lichtenberg and  van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996». 
A last approach is developed by Bernstein & Nadiri (1988), who instead of measuring 
spillovers, directly estimate spillover effects based on an adjustment-cost model of investment 
and factor demand.  However the long time series  of data needed often make this  approach 
difficult to apply. 
All these  studies  show  that  spillovers  do  exist  and  are  likely  to  be  substantial  (Griliches 
(1992».  Spillovers appear to be present at all levels of aggregation, be it that the social rate 
of return differs between levels of aggregation; Griliches (1994) attributes this to the differing 
depreciation rates. On average the social rate of return on R&D (i.e. private return plus all the 
5 Rent spillovers arise because prices of intennediate inputs are not fully adjusted for quality 
improvements resulting from R&D-investments in upstream industries.  Knowledge spillovers arise 
when the knowledge embodied in an industry'S innovation contributes to innovations in another 
industry. 
8 indirect  effects)  exceeds  the private rate of return  by  50%  to  100%  (for  an  overview  see 
Mohnen (1996),  Nadiri (1995)).  A first  glance at  the results  of different studies  seems  to 
suggest that rent spillovers contribute more to output or productivity growth than knowledge 
spillovers.  However,  such  a  comparison  across  studies  is  misleading  given  the  different 
methodologies and assumptions regarding depreciation, lagged effects ...  ).  Furthermore only 
a few  studies confront the different approaches in the same setting; these studies suggest the 
opposite,  namely  that  the  knowledge spillovers  yield  a  higher  return  than  rent  spillovers. 
Verspagen  (1997)  for  instance,  finds  that knowledge  spillovers  constructed  via  technology 
proximity matrices contributes more to the growth in TFP (total factor productivity) than rent 
spillovers  on  the  basis  of input-output  matrices.  A  similar  result  is  obtained  by  van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997): knowledge 'technology flow'  spillovers yield the highest 
return, followed by knowledge 'technology proximity' spillovers and input related spillovers. 
Although the evidence points to the importance of spillovers in explaining the performance of 
agents, it is difficult to disentangle spillovers from other factors  such as increasing returns or 
rent spillovers due to measurement error (Geroski (1996)).  Furthermore typically in studies at 
the industry-level only inter-industry spillovers are taken into account; abstraction is made of 
intra-industry flows  of knowledge.  In  line  with  the  theoretical  literature  which  identifies 
positive as well as negative effects, the empirical literature is unable to  yield stylized results 
especially for intra-industry spillovers.  Bernstein  &  Nadiri  (1989)  for  instance,  find intra-
industry spillovers to  lower unit costs, but simultaneously diminish the stock of own R&D, 
indicating the importance of the disincentive effect  of spillovers.  But other studies  suggest 
the opposite, where spillovers  stimulate own R&D  to  efficiently absorb  external know-how 
(see Geroski (1996)). Cohen &  Levinthal (1989) however find no convincing evidence for the 
absorptive  capacity  effect.  Jaffe  (1986)  finds  no  significant  effect  of  spillovers  on  the 
propensity to patent, nor on profits or market value of the firms,  but a positive effect on  the 
productivity of own R&D. 
4.  Empirical analysis 
The theoretical 10  literature  points  to  the  importance  of voluntary,  asymmetric  flows  of 
knowledge between cooperation partners.  Empirical research however has focused thus  far 
merely  on the involuntary  character of spillovers.  Using  information  on  alliances  between 
companies,  this  paper  analyzes  the  interaction between  spillovers  and  cooperation and  its 
impact on  the performance of industries.  At  the  same time,  the  difference  between  intra-
industry  and  inter-industry  cooperation  is  explicitly  taken  into  account,  as  well  the 
9 international character of spillovers.  Furthermore the data allow to differentiate between the 
impact of R&D-cooperation and other forms of cooperation. 
4.1  The K.U.L.-database on alliances 
Alliances which appeared in the financial press in the period '86-'96 have been collected and 
coded  on  a  number  of characteristics  such  as  organizational  format,  activity  (production, 
distribution,  R&D),  sector  in  which  alliance  and  partners  are  active,  nationality  of  the 
partners ...  This collection procedure, which is  common in other databases on alliances, may 
cause some misrepresentation, given that the more visible and high impact alliances have a 
larger probability of being announced in the press.  The data collection process  may cause 
also a geographical misrepresentation; given the importance of the Belgian financial press in 
gathering  the  data6.  Belgian  companies  were  clearly  more  present;  and  because  of the 
significant differences of Belgian partners on a number of characteristics, these observations 
were excluded from the analysis. 
The K.UL  database  provides  a  detailed  instrument  to  proxy  for  the  impact  of 
spillovers  on  the performance  of industries,  taking  explicitly  into  account  the  differential 
impact  of intra-industry  and  inter-industry  cooperation7•  Although  the  K.U.L-database 
contains  information  on  alliances  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  as  well  as  in  the  services 
sectors,  only  the  588  manufacturing-alliances  are  taken  into  account  in  the  productivity 
analysis.  A first  order analysis points to  the importance of intra-industry-alliances:  almost 
70% of the alliances is  set up between sectors active in the same sector.  8  R&D cooperation 
forms a minority: only 9% of the alliances has been set up solely for R&D-activities; another 
17% performs R&D activities in combination with  production and/or distribution  activities. 
More than 80% of the alliances is  international in scope; i.e. the alliance is set up by partners 
of different countries. 
4.2  Appropriability and alliances 
Information about the sector in which the different partners are active, allows to construct an 
alliance- matrix.  With rows  and columns representing individual sectors  in  which alliance 
partners are active, the matrix proxies for know-how flows between sectors through alliances. 
6 Ghemawat et al (1986) using the Wall Street Journal, end up with a similar overrepresentation in their 
sample, this time of US companies. 
7 The majority of alliances is between two or three partners (respectively 97% and 3%); alliances with 
three partners are considered as three alliances between two partners: one alliance between partners one 
and two,  a second alliance between partners one and three, and a third alliance between partners two 
and three. 
S Given that sectors had to be defined on a rather aggregate basis, intra-industry alliances may still 
include vertical alliances as well.  A notable example is the car manufacturing, which includes 
component manufacturers as well as assembly. 
10 To  the  extent  that  alliances  incorporate  spillovers,  this  matrix  identifies  transfers  of 
knowledge within and between sectors.  On the diagonal are the intra-industry alliances, off-
diagonal are the inter-industry alliances9.  Because alliances  are  typically  characterized by 
spillovers going both ways  10 ("quid pro quo") the matrix is  symmetric with cells above and 
under the diagonal being equal. 
In order to test how alliances are related to appropriability, the sectoral distribution of 
this  alliance  matrix  is  compared  with  these  of the  other  matrices  used  in  the  empirical 
spillover literature.  With input-output matrices and patent-matrices as  proxy for involuntary 
spillovers,  the correlation allows  to  analyze the relationship between the internalization of 
involuntary spillovers and cooperation 
The benchmark matrices are 6 input-output matrices  (USA,  France, Germany, Italy, 
UK and Japan), the technology flow matrix of Yale, and three so-called technology proximity 
matrices (two matrices based on EPO-information (EPO A and EPO B) and one matrix based 
on  USPO).  The input-output matrices  show the  supply  of intermediate products  between 
sectors; (rent) spillovers are going from the generating sector (rows) to the receiving sector 
(columns).  Both the technology flow matrix and the technology proximity matrices are based 
on patent information.  The technology flow  matrix  (Yale  matrix)  is  based on information 
directly  available  in  the  Canadian  patent  administration  on  principal  producers  (rows, 
spillover generating)  and  principal  users  (columns,  spillover receiving)  of knowledge.  In 
constructing the technology proximity matrices, Verspagen (1984) used information available 
in the EPO-administration on main versus supplementary classes of patents for claimable and 
not-claimable knowledge.  Linking classes to  sectors by  a concordance table,  spillovers  are 
going from the main sector (rows)  to the supplementary sector(s)  (columns).  In the USPO 
matrix patent citations are used; spillovers are going from the cited patent-sector (rows) to the 
citing patent sector(s) (columns). 
Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997) compared these matrices using factor- and 
cluster-analysis.  The results point to the similarities between the input-output matrices on the 
one hand, and the technological matrices on the other hand.  However, within the latter group 
of  matrices,  significant  differences  exist  between  the  technology  flow  matrix  and  the 
technology proximity matrices. 
Since the 'traditional'  spillover  matrices  measure intra-industry  spillovers  poorly,  only  the 
correlations  off-diagonal  are  tabulated.  11  The  magnitude  and  the  significance  of  the 
9 In the construction of the matrix only the number of alliances within and between sectors is 
considered; no information was available on the value of individual alliances. 
10 Consistent with the last footnote, no judgment is formed about the size of these spillovers.  Spillovers 
may differ in size; dependent on the fact that partners are (not) actively managing spillovers. 
II The low correlations between intra-industry alliances and the other matrices are explained by the 
failure of traditional matrices to measure intra-industry spillovers, rather than that it shows that 
alliances are no good proxy for spillovers within sector. 
11 correlations between the alliance matrix and the other matrices used in the spillover literature, 
show that alliances are related to appropriability issues.  Inter-industry alliances have a higher 
probability  of occurrence  when  involuntary  spillovers  exist  between  those  sectors.  Not 
surprisingly,  the  pattern of inter industry  pure R&D-alliances  is  reflecting the technology 
proximity matrices of Verspagen; which suggests that R&D-alliances incorporate knowledge 
spillovers.  Also not  surprisingly,  alliances  with  exclusively production and/or distribution 
activities correlate significantly and most strongly with input-output matrices,  reflecting the 
phenomenon  of  rent  spillovers.  But  table  1  provides  ample  hints  towards  alliances 
capitalizing  on  a  complementarity between  rent  and  knowledge  spillovers.  This  is  most 
straightforward in alliances with a combination of R&D and production/distribution activities. 
Such inter industry alliances show a high correlation with input-output matrices as well with 
the more technology-oriented matrices; not surprisingly these alliances seem to be important 
channels to incorporate rent as well as knowledge spillovers.  However, this observation is  not 
exclusively  valid  for  this  group  of  alliances.  The  significant  correlation  between 
production/distribution  alliances  and  technology-oriented  matrices  demonstrates  that 
knowledge flows  are not only important for R&D alliances but also for non-R&D alliances. 
Studies focusing exclusively on technological alliances  are in  this  respect uncompleted.  In 
addition, R&D alliances correlate with input-output matrices. 








Technology flow matrix13 
Yale 





**: 0.01 SIgnIfIcance level; 














Alliances  Alliances 
R&D and  prodldistr 
prodldistr 
0.29**  0.26** 
0.09  0.20** 
0.25**  0.30** 
0.27**  0.31 ** 
0.24**  0.25** 
0.30**  0.26** 
0.12**  0.11* 
0.32**  0.19** 
0.34**  0.22** 
0.29**  0.21** 
12 Because several a-values are present off-diagonal in the alliance matrix, correlations are computed 
with 1 - a value (1  if alliances are formed between sectors, a ifno alliances are set up), in order to 
prevent spurious correlation. 
13  Matrices are normalized by rows. 
12 4.3  Performance and alliances 
Building further on the theoretical and empirical link between alliances  and  spillovers,  this 
paper  proposes  to  use  alliances  as  an  alternative  channel  to  access  external  know-how. 
Alliances with external partners can be used to weight the impact of know-how from external 
sources, not only since cooperation constitutes a mechanism for voluntary transfers of know-
how,  but also since alliances are linked to  involuntary spillovers.  To facilitate comparison 
with  other studies using more traditional spillovers on the basis of input output relations or 
technology  flows,  the  model uses  a productivity  growth  model,  which  is  standard  in  this 
literature, to include the impact of external know-how. 
4.3.1  Empirical model and data 
To asses  the impact  of R&D  and  spillovers  on  industry  performance,  an  extended  Cobb-
Douglas  production  function  is  specified;  this  functional  form  is  taken  as  a  first 
approximation to a potentially much more complex relationship  (Griliches (1979)): 
Y =  c Ka.L~RoeA'+U  (1) 
where Y is  a measure of output,  K and L are the traditional inputs capital and labor, R is  a 
measure of cumulated knowledge; c is  a constant, t is  a time trend,  e is  the base of natural 
logarithms and u stands for all unmeasured factors. 
After taking the logarithms and differentiating,  a growth equation is  obtained which 
will be estimated using OLS; a, ~, A. and y will be the estimated coefficients: 
dlogY =  A. + adlogK + ~dlogL + y(RDIY) + u  (2) 
In expression (2) the research efforts -term is written in intensity form by using the definition 
I)  =  dY/dR  = y(Y/K)  and  approximating  dlogRldt  by  RD/Y  with  RD  being  R&D 
investments  14.  This assumes that depreciation is close to zero (which is a tenable assumption 
on  industry level)  and  is  consistent  with  a  constant  return  of R&D  instead  of a  constant 
elasticity.  In order to control for heteroscedasticity, (2) is written in labor-intensive form (3): 
dlogY - dlogL  = a + a(dlogK-dlogL) + (a+~-I)dlogL + y(RDIY) + u  (3) 
with A.  representing the disembodied technical change and (a+~-I) being an indication of the 
level of scale economies. 
Most variables are drawn from OECD databases, more specifically the STAN and ANBERD 
databases which are compatible. The analysis is done on a pool of 308 observations, made up 
of 22  manufacturing  industries  (defined  on  the  ISIC  Rev2  classification)  for  14  OECD 
countries.  Value added is  taken  as  a measure of output (Y);  gross fixed capital formation  is 
l3 used to compute the stock of capital (K) with the perpetual inventory method, labor (L) is the 
number  of  employees  IS,  RD  is  R&D-investments.  All  variables  (except  number  of 
employees) are expressed in constant 1990 national currencies.  Value added is  deflated by 
industry and country specific deflators, capital investment by the country specific 'gross fixed 
capital price index, and R&D with the country and sector specific value added deflatorl6. 
In  order  to  control  for  business  cycle  and  capacity  utilization  fluctuations 17,  all 
variables are averaged for the whole period; this at the same time mitigates the effects of not 
taken into account lagged effects of R&D, since the R&D-intensity is relatively stable over (a 
short period of) time. 
Spillovers are included in the analysis by decomposing the knowledge term into own R&D 
investments  and R&D-investments  of other industries  received  as  spillovers.  While other 
studies  use input-output matrices,  technology  oriented  or  trade  matrices  as  weights  in  the 
construction of the external R&D-pools, this  study proposes the use of alliance matrices to 
weigh external know-how.  By  engaging in  alliances  with  external sources,  industries  can 
access external know-how to improve own productivity.  At the same time, alliances open up 
own know-how in reciprocity. 
In contrast to  other  spillover studies  on  industry level,  which  focus  exclusively on 
inter-industry spillovers, the available information on alliances allows to analyze both inter-
industry as well as  intra-industry.  Furthermore, in constructing the external R&D pools, the 
international  dimension  is  taken  explicitly  into  account,  by  aggregating  industry  R&D 
investments across countries.  More specifically the intra-industry spillover-pool for a specific 
sector  in  a  particular  country  consists  of all  R&D-investments  of that  specific  industry 
summed across all  countries  except for that particular country;  this  pool is  weighted by  the 
international diagonal (i.e. total alliances - national alliances)  of the alliance matrices.  The 
inter-industry spillover-pool for  a  specific  sector  in  a  particular country  is  constructed  by 
summing up all R&D-investments of the other sectors over all countries and this weighting by 
the off-diagonal elements in the alliance matrices. 
Another difference with  other spillover studies is that the weights are not computed 
by row-normalizing the alliance matrices.  Because (the size of)  spillovers from one industry 
to  another industry depend not on (the size of)  spillovers from that same industry to a third 
industry, this  paper uses  a different approach.  The number of alliances between industry 1 
14 This implies that knowledge is only accumulated through R&D-investments. 
IS  As such, the quality of the labor force (e.g. education level) is not taken into account. 
16 No R&D-deflators were available; the country and sector specific value added deflator may be the 
most appropriate given that R&D-investments include labor costs as well as capital investments. 
17 These same reasons motivate why value added and not total factor productivity is used in the 
regressions. 
14 and industry 2 is  weighted by the value added of industry  I,  instead  of the total number of 
alliances formed by industry 118. 
As  already  mentioned,  the  K.U.L-database  makes  it  possible  to  disentangle  the 
individual  effects  of pure  R&D  alliances,  combined  R&D  alliances  and  the  non  R&D 
alliances, as distinct channels to access external R&D.  As such, 3 variables of intra-industry 
spillovers are constructed and another 3 variables of inter-industry variables;  as  opposed to 
one spillover variable used in other spillover studies.  Table I summarizes the expressions of 
the spillovers or external R&D pools. 
Table 1: Definition of spillover-variables 
Spillovers (intra. R&D exc1us.) 
of sector i in country I 
(n = 58) 
Spillovers (intra. R&D combined) 
of sector i in country I 
(n = 104) 
Spillovers (intra. non-R&D) 
of sector i in country I 
(n = 540) 
Spillovers (inter, R&D exc1us.) 
of sector i in country I 
(n =  52) 
Spillovers (inter, R&D combined) 
of sector i in country I 
(n =  70) 
Spillovers (inter, non-R&D) 
of sector i in country I 
(n=318) 
alliances (intra. eR&D, internatJu  Lk  RDi 
Spill(intra, eR&D)i/ =  -------------------------------------------- * ---------
alliances (intra, cR&D, internat)u 
Spill(intra, cR&D)i/ =  -------------------------------------------- * --------
Y u 
alliances (intra, nR&D, internat). 
Spill(intra, nR&D) " =  ---------------------------------------------- * -----
Yi) 
alliances (inter, eR&D)ij  Lk  RDj 
Spill(inter, eR&D) " = Lj -------------------------------------- * ---
Y,I  LkYj 
alliances (inter, cR&D)ij  Lk  RDj 
Spill(inter, cR&D) " = Lj --------------------------------------- * --------
Yi.1  LkYj 
alliances (inter, nR&D, nat)ij  RDj 
Spill(inter, nR&D)u = Lj ----------------------------------* ----- + 
Yi.1  Yj 




(i '" j) 
(i '" j) 
(i '" j) 
Lj ------------------------------------------ * ----- (i '" j) and (I '" k) 
Yi.1  LkYj 
with i,j = 1, ...  22 sectors 
and k, I = 1, ... 14 countries 
Because of the multicollinearity between the  exclusively  R&D  and  combined  R&D  intra-
industry alliances,  only two intra-industry spillover variables  were included in the analysis: 
one based on R&D alliances (which is the sum of the variables Spil/(intra, eR&D)" and Spill(intra, 
cR&D)") and the other based on non R&D alliances (variable Spill(intra, nR&D) i/)'  In the case of 
18  Ideally, the number of firms active in industry 1 would be used.  Because these data were not 
15 inter-industry  alliances,  the  limited  number  of R&D  alliances  however  did  not  lead  to 
multicollinearity; as such 3 inter-industry spillover variables were used as defined in Tabel 1. 
Because of the  significant  differences  between  national  and  international  inter-non-R&D-
alliances,  a distinction  is  made between  national and  international inter-industry  spillovers. 
For the inter-R&D- alliances (exclusively and combined) national and international alliances 
showed the same sectoral distribution. 
4.3.2.  Results and discussion 
The  discussion  will  focus  on  the  effects  of the  intra  and  inter-industry  R&D-pool  on  the 
growth  in  productivity.  Basically there are two  reasons  why  the  intra-pool  for  a  specific 
sector in a particular country can be large.  Either because the sector has  many intra industry 
R&D andlor non-R&D  alliances  that  allow  to  access  this  know-how base,  or because the 
country has  a larger accessible know how base, which typically holds for  follower countries 
with a smaller own know-how base in the particular sector.  Similarly, the inter-pool will be 
large for sectors that have many inter-industry alliances or a larger accessible know-how base, 
which is more likely to hold for low-tech industries.  High-tech industries will typically have 
a lower total inter-industry know-how base to access. 
The  pool  of externally  accessible  know-how  will  have  a  positive  effect  on  own 
productivity  growth;  however  a  positive  (negative)  effect  for  the  inter  variables  on 
productivity growth will only occur when inter industry  alliances have a positive (negative) 
effect on own productivity. Based on the results of earlier studies and given the internalization 
issues  of R&D-cooperation,  it  can  be expected that  inter-industry alliances  have a positive 
effect on productivity.  The theoretical lO-literature has pointed to the higher profits and thus 
larger  incentives  for  firms  in  inter-industry  cooperation,  which  results  in  higher  R&D 
investments  and  higher  output  levels.  Furthermore  information  sharing  between  partners 
enhances incoming spillovers, as such firms cooperating with firms in other industries should 
a fortiori benefit from the knowledge developed by these other firms/industries. 
This  is  different for  intra-industry  spillovers;  as  made  clear by  the theoretical 10-
literature.  In horizontal alliances, the competitive effect is stronger.  The internalization effect 
will  only  dominate  if spillovers  are  high enough.  Differences  in  R&D  efficiency  andlor 
absorptive capacity,  possibly reinforced by free riding by partners,  will  be reflected  in  the 
different  size  of the spillovers  going from one partner  to  the  other.  This  may  lead  to  a 
negative effect on the industry output level and productivity for those follower countries that 
have a lower own R&D base, and hence a larger external accessible base as compared to the 
available, value added is used. 
16 leader countries.  19.20.  With follower countries standing more to loose from intra-industry 
alliances because of a lower absorptive capacity, the follower countries however have at the 
same time a larger know how base to access and may still be far from diminishing returns to 
knowledge  creation.  All  this  makes  the  expected  effect  of  intra-industry  alliances 
ambiguous.  Furthermore,  especially  for  intra-industry  alliances  a  different  effect  can be 
expected between R&D alliances  and non-R&D alliances.  Production  and/or  distribution 
alliances formed by partners in the same industry are typically set up to enhance efficiency 
(economies of scale, rationalizations of overcapacity  ...  )  or are motivated by market power 
reasons. 
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Re1!ression (2)  Re1!ression (3) 
0.044  0.014 
0.116**  0.127** 
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- 0.512  - 0.144 
Country dummies  Sector dummies 
64.6S%  73.02% 
The results contain some interesting observations (regression (1».  First, the coefficient of the 
labor term points to decreasing returns to scale, which can be explained by the fact that R&D-
investments are not segregated out the conventional input factors labor and capital.  Second, 
the  results  confirm the  importance  of (own)  R&D  in  productivity  growth,  however  the 
negative quadratic term (significance = 0.06) point to the decreasing marginal return of R&D. 
R&D investments have an excess return21  of 11 %,  which is in line with other industry studies, 
but is lower than studies focusing  on the firm level.  So far,  the  results  seem to  confirm 
existing "know-how" on drivers for productivity growth. 
More interesting are the results for the intra and inter R&D pool.  The positive effect 
of the non-R &D intra-industry pool can be explained by the positive impact of intra-industry 
19 The smaller output will directly result in a lower productivity per employee given the rather 
inflexibility of the labor market in most of the 14 countries.  The high cost of hiring and firing 
employees will inhibit companies to instantly reduce the employment. 
20 Inter-industry alliances are in themselves asymmetric given the different industries of the partners; 
however the smaller competitive effect mitigates the potential negative effect of this asymmetry. 
21  Excess return because of the double counting of R&D-investments in the R&D-variable as well in 
the traditional input factors. 
17 alliances  set  up  for  production  and  or  distribution  activities  on  industry  output  and 
productivity.  This result is consistent with efficiency motivations in setting up alliances.  The 
negative coefficient for the R&D-intra-pool confirms the adversial impact R&D cooperation 
can have  on  the  productivity  of the  individual  partners,  and  on  aggregate  for  the  whole 
industry.  A first explanation for this negative sign may be the size of the spillovers: in low 
spillover industries, cooperation in R&D results in lower R&D-investments and lower output 
levels compared to  independent R&D.  However,  the negative effect can also  indicate that 
advantaged  partners  succeed  more  successfully  in  absorbing  the  knowledge  of  the 
disadvantaged  partner  via  the  alliance,  maybe  at  the  same  time  concealing  its  own 
technological expertise.  Smaller countries  with  lower own R&D  (and  hence a large intra 
accessible  R&D  base  to  tap  on)  may  experience  a  more  negative  effect  of engaging  in 
alliances with leader countries that are more apt to absorb any know-how, thus  eroding their 
own competitive advantage. This matters especially in intra-industry transactions. 
This  negative  effect of R&D-alliances  may  also  explain  why  the  number  of intra-
industry R&D alliances  is  rather limited.  In  the K.D.L.  alliance database only 25%  of the 
intra-industry alliances include R&D-activities (exclusively or in combination), while in inter-
industry-alliances 38% are of the R&D-type (difference significant at the 0.001  level).  Firms 
are aware of the potential pitfalls and will prefer not to set up alliances with fIrms  of the same 
industry. 
Contrary to  expectations,  inter-industry R&D  alliances  have no  significant  positive 
effect on industry output and productivity: fIrms  do not seem to benefit from the knowledge 
accumulated in  other industries,  accessed through R&D  or non-R&D  alliances.  However, 
inter-industry  alliances  that  combine  R&D  with  production/distribution  activities  have  a 
significant  negative  effect  on  productivity  growth.  This  again  can  be  explained  by 
competitive issues made earlier in the discussion with respect to the intra-industry alliances. 
The  only  difference  is  that  in  inter-industry  alliances  no  actual  competitor  but  potential 
competitors may weaken your competitive position. Given that not only knowledge is  shared 
but also some operational activities  implies that especially these types  of vertical  alliances, 
can accommodate entry by partners in the own industry.  This observation is  especially valid 
for industries which because of the convergence of certain technologies, becomes increasingly 
integrated with other industries.  Traditional studies that measure involuntary  inter-industry 
spillover through other means than alliances, are not likely to pick up this negative effect. 
Including country dummies (regression 2) and sector dummies (regression 3) do not alter the 
estimation results fundamentally.  The impact of intra-industry  spillovers  in  R&D-alliances 
remains  negative,  as  opposed  to  the  positive influence of intra-industry  spillovers  in  non-
R&D-alliances.  Inter-industry spillovers  only  matter in  alliances  where R&D-activities  are 
combined with  production/distribution.  Including sector-dummies  lowers  the  coefficient of 
18 the own R&D-variable, to the point of no longer being significant.  This result is  consistent 
with other studies. 
The robustness of the results (Table 3) is further demonstrated by defining the intra- and inter 
spillovers solely as  accessible know how base (i.e.  without weights,  assuming perfect non-
rivalry of knowledge).  Regressions  including spillovers defined in this  manner (regression 
(4»  show no impact on productivity growth, which demonstrates that it is not only absorptive 
capacity which  explains  the negative impact of intra- and  inter R&D-alliances.  Similarly, 
regressions including solely the sectoral distribution of alliances as spillover variables have no 
explanatory  power.  The  results  are  also  conf"rrmed  by  using  the  'traditional'  spillover 
matrices (input output matrix USA,  Yale matrix, matrix A of Verspagen), consequently only 
focusing on inter-industry spillovers.  The results reported in Table 3 show that involuntary 
inter-industry spillovers do not have a positive influence on productivity growth;  as such the 
results  of other  studies  pointing  to  a  positive  impact  of inter-industry  spillovers  are  not 
confirmed  here.  While  these  latter  studies  only  analyzed  national  spillovers,  explicitly 
modeling international  does  not lead  to  significant findings:  productivity  growth  does  not 
benefit from national as well as international inter industry spillovers (regressions (5) (6) (7». 
All  this  suggests  that especially in  alliances  the larger capabilities  of advantaged firms  in 
absorbing know how is  important. The two-way transfer of knowledge in  alliances  through 
sharing  and  exchanging  information between  typically  heterogeneous  partners  specifically 
increase the importance of the absorption potential, leading to the prevalence of asymmetric 
spillovers, which in tum may negatively affect productivity growth.  Only taking into account 
accessing inter-industry know-how through alliances leads to  significant negative effects on 
own productivity growth. 
Table 3: Robustness checks 
Variables'"  Regression  Regression  Regression  Regression 
(4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Intercept  0.013**  0.015**  0.013**  0.011 ** 
Capital  0.145**  0.153**  0.147**  0.143** 
Labor  - 0.763**  - 0.755**  - 0.759**  - 0.757** 
R&D  0.026  0.024  0.025  0.024 
Know how base (intra)  - 0.0000427 
Know how base (inter)  - 0.0000011 
10 matrix USA national  - 0.029 
IO matrix USA internal.  - 0.00009 
Yale matrix national  - 0.022 
Yale matrix internal.  0.00002 
22 A first regression was run with all 6 spillover variables included; however because of 
multicollinearity, the effect of the intra-spillovers variables was not clear. 
19 Verspagen matrix A nat. 
Verspagen matrix A into 
R2 adj 
**: 0.01 sigruficance level; 
* : 0.05 significance level; 




60.25%  59.94%  60.22% 
The  theoretical literature has  pointed to  the importance of R&D-cooperation for  spillovers, 
suggesting  that  spillovers  induce  cooperation  as  a  means  to  internalize  these  involuntary 
effects, while cooperation at the same time enhances voluntary spillovers through information 
sharing.  The empirical results in this  paper show that R&D  cooperation is  indeed strongly 
correlated with the occurrence of involuntary spillovers, based on input-output relations and 
technology  proximity.  But  not  only  R&D-cooperation  corresponds  to  (the  lack  of) 
appropriability; the evidence shows that also non-R&D alliances are associated with transfers 
of knowledge. 
Following the association of alliances with spillovers, this paper analyses the impact 
of external know-how on the performance of industries  in OEeD-countries  where external 
know-how is  weighted by the occurrence of alliances with the external source, based in the 
same industry or in other industries. The differential impact of intra-industry alliances versus 
inter-industry  alliances,  as  well  as  of R&D-alliances  versus  non  R&D-alliances  is  clearly 
illustrated.  Intra-industry R&D  alliances  give rise to  transfers  of knowledge which have a 
negative impact on  productivity growth,  while for  inter-industry alliances  this  only  is  true 
when  R&D  activities  are  combined  with  production/distribution  activities.  Non-R&D 
alliances  have a  positive influence because of its  efficiency  enhancement  in  intra-industry 
settings. 
The  results  of the  paper  support  the  insights  that  cooperation  is  a  mechanism  to 
manage transfers of knowledge:  alliances  are an  effective channel to  get access  to  external 
knowledge especially for advantaged partners.  Because of their larger absorptive capacity, 
advantaged partners are more able to effectively learn from others,  while at  the same time 
protecting their own expertise.  The asymmetric spillovers that result may lead to a negative 
influence on  productivity growth for  the disadvantaged partners.  The specific character of 
alliances  as  spillover  channel,  may  thus  give  rise  to  transfers  of  knowledge  that  may 
negatively affect industry productivity. This especially holds in intra-industry alliances where 
partners  are  direct  competitor.  In  inter-industry  alliances,  this  competitive  effect  is  less 
apparent; however alliances which combine R&D and production activities can turn partners 
in potential competitors by accommodating their entry. 
20 The results of the paper should incite further theoretical and empirical research on the 
role  of alliances  in  diffusing  know-how,  carefully  indicating  circumstances  in  which  an 
innovation system should  nurture alliances  and  networking to  increase the  productivity  of 
improvements in know-how.  Such results are not only important for rrrm strategies vis-a-vis 
cooperation,  but also  to  governments  considering  stimulating  cooperation  as  part  of their 
innovation policy. 
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